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Auditing As A Signal 
in Small Business Lending
Bala G. D haran
This paper models the borrowing decision of a small firm seeking a bank 
loan when it can optionally hire, at a cost, an independent external 
auditor to convey its risk characteristics to lenders. The analysis shows 
that a necessary condition for a potential borrower to prefer having an 
audit to not having an audit is that the borrower’s debt to equity ratio 
must be above a certain minimum cut-off value. For observed audit cost 
functions, this cut-off debt-equity ratio is higher for smaller initial size 
firms. Such firms will forego an audit even if they are of low risk, and 
potentially face loan denial and higher interest rate. Additionally, the cut­
off debt-equity ratio is an increasing function of audit cost. Hence smaller 
audit costs may allow more high quality small firms to reveal their types 
to the banks, thus leading to a more partially separating equilibrium. 
The model suggests a number of interesting empirical questions for 
further study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Borrowers of capital in financial markets face the problem of credibly 
informing potential lenders about their projects’ quality since such 
messages are subject to moral hazard. This paper models the borrowing 
decision of a small firm seeking a bank loan when it can optionally hire, 
at a cost, an independent external auditor to validate its cash flow 
projections. In other words the auditor’s opinion is assumed to convey the 
risk characteristics of the firm to the lenders without error. Of course, firms 
which are publicly traded are required by securities laws to have a periodic 
audit of their financial statements. Thus a decision to seek an audit of 
financial statements is not a choice variable for these firms and hence 
cannot act as a signal of firm quality. However, such a signalling option 
exists for small firms which are typically closely held. This paper examines 
the nature of this decision.
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Signalling models of financial decisions such as dividend policy, equity 
financing and debt financing have been examined in the past by numerous 
papers including Leland and Pyle [12], Ross [15], Bhattacharya [4,5], Miller 
and Rock [13], Titman and Trueman [19], and others. Titman and Trueman 
specifically examine the audit decision and show that the perceived “quality” 
of a firm’s choice of auditor (or investment banker) prior to an initial public 
offering would be a signal of the firm’s riskiness. Unlike Titman and 
Trueman, this paper examines the more basic question of whether or not 
the decision to have an audit prior to seeking a loan (say from a bank) can 
serve as a signal of the firm’s riskiness. Note that the cost of the audit is always 
paid by the borrowing firm, regardless of whether the firm volunteers to have 
an audit before requesting the loan or whether the lender requests the audit. 
In addition, since the audit can reveal the borrower’s true risk characteristics 
to the lender, an audit may actually reduce a borrower’s chance of getting 
a loan. Thus the decision to have an audit is a “costly signal” which can 
credibly be used to signal the firm’s risk characteristics.
The analysis here shows that a necessary condition for a potential 
borrower to prefer having an audit to not having an audit is that the 
borrower’s debt to equity ratio must be above a certain minimum cut-off 
value. This minimum debt-equity ratio depends on the borrower’s initial 
wealth, the borrower’s risk preferences, the investment return distribution, 
and the audit cost. In particular, the analysis shows, that the minimum debt- 
equity ratio is an increasing function of the audit cost and a decreasing 
function of the initial wealth. In other words, the cut-off debt-equity ratio 
is higher for smaller initial size firms.
In the next section, the institutional characteristics of small business 
lending are described. In Section 3, the basic model of the firm, the bank, 
the audit and the project is set up. Section 4 analyzes the audit decision. 
Section 5 examines the effect of firm size and audit cost on the audit decision. 
In the concluding section, empirical implications are discussed and some 
propositions for empirical testing are outlined.
2. SMALL FIRMS, BANKS AND AUDITING
The role of auditing in small business lending decisions has received some 
attention in recent years from U.S. regulators such as the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In addition, there has been much 
interest in recent years in the capital formation problems of small business 
firms generally and in the regulatory costs incurred by small businesses in 
raising capital. One such cost is the cost of audit. Currentiy all U.S. 
businesses, regardless of size, must follow the same generally accepted
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accounting principles (GAAP) to prepare their audited financial reports, and 
their CPAs must follow the same generally accepted auditing standards 
(GAAS) to audit them. It is known that accounting and auditing costs show 
positive economies of scale, with auditing costs in particular increasing with 
the square root of sales rather than linearly with sales (Simunic [16]; Dopuch 
and Simunic [6]). Hence small businesses are likely to find audit costs more 
burdensome than larger firms. This has raised suggestions that less costly 
reporting requirements (dubbed “little GAAP” and "little GAAS”) should 
be developed for use by small businesses (FASB [8]).
In a research study sponsored by the FASB to address these issues, Abdel- 
khalik [ 1 ] surveyed end-users such as bank lending officers and found support 
for less complex and less expensive small business reporting requirements. 
A survey of practicing CPAs by Knutson and Wichmann [11] also found 
strong support for such an approach. Anderson et al. [3] note that small firms 
have differing characteristics than large firms, such as weaker internal 
controls and dominance of an owner-manager, that create unique audit 
problems. Similarly, a special committee report of the American Institute 
of CPAs examining the issue of “standards overload” for small businesses 
recommended the elim ination of certain burdensome auditing and 
accounting standards and adoption of a different set of measurement and 
disclosure standards for small businesses (AICPA [2]).
A small number of studies have empirically examined whether the 
presence or absence of audit (or types of audit) makes a difference in small 
business lending decisions. Houghton [9] reports on an Australian 
experiment involving 247 lending officers evaluating a hypothetical loan 
application for A$60,000 from a small business company with a net worth 
of about A$180,000. A third of the subjects received the firm’s financial 
statements together with a “clean” opinion from the firm’s auditors. For 
another third, the statements were accompanied by a “qualified” auditor’s 
opinion. The remaining officers did not get an auditor’s opinion with the 
financial statements. Houghton found that the lending outcome “was not 
significantly influenced by either the presence or the content of audit 
reports.” He notes that his result may have been driven by the small size of 
the loan even though the implied debt-equity ratio was large. Somewhat 
conflicting results have been reported by studies examining American 
lending officers [10] and British lenders [7, 17].
Despite the above studies, many aspects of small business lending remain 
in need of further study. For example, we do not know whether the banks 
charge differential interest rates for audited and non-audited firms, or the 
sensitivity of the audit decision to the banks’ interest rate policies. It is also 
not known what decision variables (e.g., availability of collateral; loan size; 
firm’s life) are emphasized by banks in the absence of an audited statement.
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Informal discussions with officers of some small and large U.S. banks 
reveal that a large percentage of small business borrowers whose loan requests 
were approved by the banks were not asked to submit audited financial 
statements. However, many borrowers did volunteer audited statements. This 
paper examines whether such an action is consistent with a signalling model 
in which low risk borrowers elect to use a costly signal to distinguish 
themselves from high risk borrowers. The next section provides the model 
of the firm and its cost structure.
3. MODEL OF THE FIRM 
The Firm
The potential borrower firm has an initial “wealth” or investible assets, 
W, and an increasing, strictly concave continuous utility function, U, defined 
on the firm’s end-of-period asset level. * The firm has the opportunity to invest 
in a project requiring an investment. I, which is greater than its investible 
assets. While the firm can alternatively invest just W in the project, the 
optimum investment level for the project is greater than W, motivating the 
firm to seek external financing.
Firms differ from one another according to their “risk type,” 6, with 
higher values of 6 corresponding to riskier borrowers. A firm’s true risk type 
is not observable, unless the firm voluntarily elects to undergo an audit 
conducted by an external auditing firm which will provide perfect 
information about the firm’s risk type.^
The Project
The project’s end-of-period cash outflow, X, from an initial investment 
of I is given by X =  (1 +  r)g(I), where g{I) is assumed increasing stricdy 
concave in I.^  The project’s rate of return, r, is stochastic, defined over the 
range [—1, JR] where R is some large value, with a distribution function given 
by F{r). The project is considered successful if its rate of return, r, turns out, 
ex post, to be greater than a break-even value r^, at which the project cash 
flows would be sufficient to repay the loan and the accrued interest to the 
bank. If the loan interest rate is a, then rm is solved from
( l+ r „ ) g ( / )  =  ( l+ a ) i5 .  (1)
If the actual return is less than Vm, then the firm defaults on the loan.'* Note 
that Tm depends on the audit decision since the loan amount, B, would be
4 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 2(1) 1992
larger if an audit is sought (due to the non-zero cost of the audit). In addition, 
Tm depends on the firm size, the audit cost, and the interest rate (discussed 
below), all of which are firm-specific. Hence the break-even return is firm- 
specific.
The Bank
Modeling the decision-making process of the bank can be complex, since 
bapks can optimize on any one of a number of loan variables such as interest 
rate, loan size and mix, quality and amount of collateral offered, firm’s credit 
history, etc. In addition, as noted earlier, at present we have very little 
empirical data on many of diese decision variables, such as the relationship 
between the interest rate charged and loan size, risk type, audit decision etc. 
In this paper, it is assumed that the bank’s policy is to approve all loans 
if the bank can observe the firm’s risk type from the firm’s audit report and 
if the risk type is below a cut-off level, 6*. The interest rate charged, a, is 
an increasing function of the observed risk type.^ However, if the firm’s 
observed risk type exceeds the bank’s cut-off value, then the loan is denied. 
This form of loan approval policy can be due to either regulatory or economic 
factors and is commonly observed in banks. As Stiglitz and Weiss [18] and 
others have observed, it is in the interest of a bank to turn down credit requests 
from high-risk borrowers rather than make loans at higher and higher 
interest rates, since very high interest rates will only increase the borrower’s 
default risk. Moreover, bank regulations in most countries (and many states 
in the U.S.) apply caps on lending rates to protect customers from “usury” 
practices. The bank-specific values of the cut-off risk level, d*, and the interest 
rate function (including the cut-off interest rate, a* =  ol{6*)) are assumed 
known to potential borrowers.
If the borrower does not submit to an audit, then the bank does not 
observe the borrower’s risk type and hence cannot use it to make the loan 
decision. In such cases, the bank is assumed to make the loan decision based 
on the size of the loan.^ If the borrower requests a trivially small loan, the 
bank assigns a much smaller default risk than if the borrower requests a “very 
large” loan without an audit. Specifically, given an unaudited loan request 
of size B, the bank would approve the loan with a probability where 
tt{B) =  1 for B =  0 and dTr{B)/dB <  0. In addition, the interest rate charged 
on approved loans is a*, which is the highest rate charged by the bank to 
firms which submit audited statements (i.e., ot{6*)). This follows from the 
bank’s assumption that if the firm does not submit to an audit it must be 
of “high risk type,” though, as will shown below, some firms with risk below 
6* may also choose to forego an audit because their requested loan size is 
very small. In such cases, the firms would win loan approval with a high
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probability, although at the high interest rate of a*. Thus, the combined 
policy of chzirging the highest interest rate and making the loan approval 
uncertain provides an incentive to large borrow^ers to seek an audit and 
potentially get a lower-interest rate loan, while permitting small borrowers 
to trade off the cost of audit for the higher interest cost.
4. THE AUDIT DECISION
If the borrowing firm decides to present the bank with audited financial 
statements, it will have to pay its auditor an up-front fee of C{W), which 
is assumed to be increasing concave with respect to the firm’s size. As noted 
earlier, this assumption is consistent with the findings in the audit-fee 
literature, including Simunic [16] who reports that C(W) is a linear function 
of the square root of W For the firm, the fee is small and affordable with 
respect to initial investible assets, i.e., C{W) <  W.
Affordability does not, of course, mean that the audit would be sought. 
In particular, if the firm is riskier than B*, it will clearly not volunteer for 
an audit as part of its loan request, since the audit will perfectly reveal the 
firm’s type to the bank. But even for a firm whose risk type is less then 0*, 
an audit is not always preferred unless the desired loan size is “large” relative 
to the firm’s asset size. The logic is essentially based on the information 
“economies of scale” argument of Wilson [20], viz, the amount borrowed 
must be of a certain minimum size relative to the firm’s initial size in order 
to “justify” the audit costs, and is similar to that used by Ohlson [14] to show 
that it does not pay for a portfolio manager to acquire information unless 
the investment level is substantial.
Consider the case where the firm seeks a loan without an audit. The 
firm’s expected utility, if the loan is approved, is given by:
7^(7) = f  C7[(l+ r)g(I) -  (l+a*)(7 -  W)]dF(r) (2)
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rm
where the superscript N  stands for the “no-audit case. If the loan is not 
approved, the borrower can always invest his initial wealth in the project 
(though, as noted, this is not the optimal level), giving the firm an expected 
utility of T^(W). Hence the ex-ante expected utility of the no-audit decision 
is given by:
EU^(I) =  ttT^(I) +  (1 -  7t) 7^( W). (3)
where tt =  7r{I — W) is the probability of loan approval.
The firm’s ex-ante expected utility given an audit decision can be defined 
similarly. This means, of course, that the firm’s 6 <  6*, since the firm’s loan 
request would be definitely denied otherwise. Thus we need to consider only 
the case of loan being approved. Hence we get
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£[/"(/) = 1  U [(1 +  r)g(I) -  (l+a(0){I ~ W  +  C{W)}]dF{r). (4)
m
where the superscript A stands for the “audit” case.’ Note that though the 
lower bound, rm, in equations (4) and (2) are both computed using equation 
(1), the value of is different in (4) and (2) since the loan amounts are 
different.
From the forms of the two ex-ante utility functions, it is clear that the 
optimum level of investment would differ for the two decisions. Let be 
the potential borrower’s optimal investment level given his decision to seek 
a loan without an audit (the no-audit case), and I"* be the optimal investment 
level given his decision to apply for a loan with a perfect information audit. 
Then the audit decision can be stated as follows: Select audit if EU' {^I' )^ >  
EU^{I^), i.e., the expected utility from audit-investment should exceed the 
no-audit-investment case.*
5. EFFECT OF AUDIT COST AND FIRM SIZE ON AUDIT DECISION
In the U.S. and most other countries, the auditing profession is prohibited 
against contingent audit fees. As a result, the audit cost, C{W), is a function 
of the firm’s initial size but not the loan amount sought. Therefore it is clear 
that there will be investment levels extremely close to W (i.e., as the loan 
amount B approaches zero), where it will not pay to have the audit. Moreover, 
if a company would find it preferable to have an audit at the optimal 
investment level /  =  /^ and would not need an audit at 7 =  (i.e., no loan 
sought), then there must be a cut-off investment level, f ,  between the initial 
wealth level, W, and the optimal investment level, 1^ , where the transition 
from no-audit to audit would occur. That is, at /  =  7^ , the two expected utility 
curves, and EU^, will intersect, such that is greater than f  for the 
case where an audit is preferred to no-audit.
The nature of the audit cost function, therefore, leads to a “firm size 
effect” in the audit decision, viz, the desired investment level with an audit 
must be “large” relative to initial wealth. Specifically, firms will seek an audit 
only if their targeted debt-equity ratio, I^/W, is greater than a cut-off debt- 
equity ratio, f /W ^
This result, which is derived from a simple cost-benefit analysis, raises 
an important question: is the cut-off debt-equity ratio a function of firm size?
More specifically, is the cut-off debt-equity ratio larger for a small business? 
This question has public policy implications since more “burdensome values 
of the minimal debt-equity ratio for small business firms may be considered 
as undesirable for economic objectives such as job creation and venture 
capitalism.
To analyze the effect of the firm size on the cut-off debt-equity ratio, 
this section will assume that the project production function, X, is 
homogeneous of degree one, so that it can be written in the form of the debt- 
equity ratio as follows:
X =  (1 +  r)g(I) =  (1 -1- r)Wg(I/W).
Consider a firm that prefers an “audit and seek loan” decision to a “no-audit 
and no-loan” decision. Under the latter case, the initial asset can still be 
invested in the project, and thus we get
(1 +  r)Wg{I/W) -  (1 +  a){I - W  +  C {W)) >  (1 +  r) Wg{W/W). (5)
Inequality (5) can be rewritten by dividing both sides by W as
(1 +  r)g(I/W) -  (1 +  a)(I/W  -  1 +  C (W yW ) >  (1 +  r)g(l). (6)
One way to interpret (6) is that when the stated inequality is satisfied, firms 
would seek an audit with their loans. Obviously, when /  =  the inequality 
is not satisfied and audit will never be preferred, consistent with the cost- 
benefit argument stated earlier.
The term C(W)/W  in equation (6) represents the per-unit audit cost. 
As noted, it is known from past studies that C(W) is increasing concave and 
in particular, C(W) is a square root function of W, e.g., C(W) =  where 
k is some normalizing factor. For such known audit cost functions, C(W)/ 
W decreases as W increases. For smaller firms, the audit cost per dollar of 
asset is much larger than the cost per asset dollar for larger firms. Thus, from 
(6), as W becomes greater, the left hand side gets larger and thus the inequality 
is more likely to be met. In other words, given the known structure of audit 
cost functions, larger firms are more likely to seek an audit with loans. The 
audit cost is more “burdensome” to smaller firms in the sense of C(W)/W 
being larger, which leads smaller firms to forego the audit.**
The above discussion suggests that it is a priori less likely that a small 
initial size firm would prefer an audit, given what we know about the shape 
of the audit cost function. This raises an interesting signalling aspect of the 
audit decision problem. If a small firm signals “loan with no audit,” the 
bank can interpret this signal in two different ways: 1) the firm is very risky
8 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 2(1) 1992
(i.e., has 6 >  6*), or 2) the firm is low-risk (0 <  6*) but perceives the audit 
to be too costly. Of course, the bank knows that it is unlikely that a smaller 
initial size firm would want an audit, even if the firm is "low risk”. On the 
other hand, the bank would be much more skeptical of a larger firm that 
claims an audit is too costly. For a given debt/equity ratio, it is much more 
likely that the true reason a larger firm does not want an audit is that the 
firm is high risk. Hence the bank is much more likely to extend a loan with 
no audit to a small firm than to a larger firm, for similarly targeted debt- 
equity ratios.
Another interesting signalling aspect of the audit decision problem 
relates to the effect of the cost of the signalling on the existence of a separating 
equilibrium where banks can identify high-risk firms from low-risk firms 
from their audit signals. If audit costs are prohibitively high, neither good 
nor poor quality small firms would choose to signal their quality with an 
audit. Thus a bank receiving unaudited financial statements from a small 
firm applicant cannot infer that the applicant is necessarily of high risk (poor 
quality). This would lead to a pooling equilibrium where all applicants are 
treated equally (as risky) by the bank.*^ If the audit costs are less burdensome, 
(i.e., with C{W)/W  becoming smaller for a given level of W), at least some 
of the high-quality small firms would seek a loan with audit, but low-quality 
firms would still not attempt to have an audit. Thus lower audit costs can 
lead to a partially separating equilibrium where at least some of the high- 
quality small firms are distinguishable from the low quality firms.
6. CONCLUSION
The analysis in the paper shows that small business firms seeking loans face 
a size hurdle when deciding whether to voluntarily seek an audit. A size- 
based audit cost function, such as the square root function observed in 
practice, leads small firms below a cut-off size to forego an audit even if they 
are of high quality (low risk) from the point of view of the banks. Such firms 
then face a non-zero probability that their loans will be denied even when 
they are of high quality. The analysis shows that the minimal or cut-off debt- 
equity ratio is an increasing function of audit cost. Hence smaller audit costs 
may allow more high quality small firms to reveal their types to the banks, 
thus leading to a more partially separating equilibrium.
The analysis suggests a number of interesting empirical questions for 
study. The proposition that the minimal debt-equity ratio of audit-seeking 
companies is an increasing function of audit costs could be empirically tested 
provided data on audit costs and loan files are made available by banks. Banks 
would want to know whether there are risk differences between companies
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which seek loans with and without audit (or services such as review or 
compilation). They would also be interested in the relationship between their 
interest rate policy (i.e., the shape of the a(6) function) and the nature of 
small firm audit decision. Small firms would want to know whether the 
probability of loan approval is a function of the audit decision. More data 
and research on these and related issues are needed to increase our 
understanding of the financial markets for small firms.
Acknowledgment: This paper has benefitted from comments from the seminar participants 
at the 2nd Annual Small Business Finance Symposium, Fresno, CA. Suggestions from two 
anonymous referees also greatly improved the paper’s modeling.
NOTES
1. Due to limited liability, the utility is assumed zero for all asset levels less than zero.
2. Such an assumption is consistent with the observed widespread use of audited financial 
statements in lending decisions.
3. The concavity of g(I) is assumed so that the optimum investment size and hence the 
required size of bank loan are finite. The results in the paper do not, for the most part, 
depend on the shape of g(I)—for example, linear functions would also suffice. In section 
5, however, it is assumed that g(I) is a homogeneous function of degree one.
4. Due to limited liability, the firm’s utility is lower-bounded at zero in the case of default
5. The loan decision and the interest rate may also depend, in practice, on loan size, since 
a bank’s resource constraints would usually limit its lending potential. Here we assume 
that the loan request is within the bank’s lending range.
6. As noted earlier, the loan size is assumed to be within the bank’s normal lending range.
7. It can be seen that the two ex-ante utility functions given in (3) and (4) are continuous
 
in I.
8. The basic assumption that the firm’s desired investment level. I, is greater than its initial 
wealth, W, implies that either or EU^{I^) is greater than 7 (^W )^.
9. Because of the one-to-one relationship between the investment-equity ratio, I/W, and 
the corresponding debt-equity ratio, (/ — W)/W, the two terms are used interchangeably 
in this paper.
10. The assumption that C(W) is increasing concave does not, by itself, always imply that 
C{WyW is a decreasing function of W. For example if C{W) =  In W, then C(W)/W 
increases as W increases for values of W  in the open interval (0,e). However, for observed 
and known functions of audit cost such as the square root function, C{W)/W  is indeed 
a decreasing function of W.
11. An exception to this statement would be if g{I/W) is sufficiently large so that the 
inequality in (5) is still satisfied even though C(W )/W  is high. However, the investment- 
equity ratio I /W  and consequently the debt equity ratio (I — W )/W  may be so large 
in such cases that the bank may not grant the loan despite the firm’s risk being below 
the bank’s cut-off risk.
12. At the other extreme, a truly separating equilibrium will exist only if the audit cost is 
zero. Then all high-quality firms (regardless of firm size or loan size) will choose to have 
an audit and all low-quality firms will not seek audit
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